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THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
AND ANTI-TRUST LAWS
WILLIAM R. WARD*

The underlying idea of a cooperative organization is that a
business owned by its customers, managed under their direction
and having no legitimate loyalties except to them has a better
chance to meet their needs than one owned and managed by outsiders. A Cooperative Marketing Association may be defined as
a group of producers working together to sell their products
without competing against one another.1
The legal status of the cooperative form is so vague that it
is necessary to examine the relationship between the cooperative
and its members, as expressed in its by-laws, articles of incorporation and contractual agreements with its members to decide
if it is a "true" cooperative. The four basic principles or cornerstones of the cooperative form of organization are:
(1)
The legally enforceable obligation of the cooperative as a legal entity to return to its member and
patrons in proportion to their patronage, all surplus over
and above operating expenses.
(2) A membership open to all without discrimination. It follows from this that the value of a share will
automatically remain at par and that a transfer of a
share of the variable capital of a cooperative will not be
an impersonal stock exchange transaction.
(3) The equality of voting rights of all members
regardless of number of shares held by the member.
This democratic control means that the cooperative is
essentially an association of persons and not of capital.
(4) A limited or fixed rate of return on the invested
capital so that the cooperative shares are in the nature of
an indebtedness and are not entrepreneurial."
While the legislatures and courts of this country have not
been uniform in their recognition of these basic distinctions of
the cooperative form from other business forms, in this country
it may be said that the first, at least, is essential.:,
The chief uses of the cooperative form in the United States
have been:
(1) Agricultural producers cooperatives, for the sale and
processing of produce.
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
I Vernon A. Mund, Government
and Business, p. 218.
2 Barnes,
Cooperatives in International Trade, 1950 Wisconsin Law Review 266.
'Charles Bunn, Consumer Cooperatives and Price Fixing Laws, 40 Michigan Law Review 165.
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(2)

Producers Cooperatives, for the purchase and manufacture of productive equipment and supplies.
(3) Merchant Cooperatives, for the manufacture and purchase of merchandise.
(4) Consumer Cooperatives, for the manufacture,
purchase
4
and supply of all kinds of goods and services.
It should be noted, that in the past, there has been a growing
tendency toward an integrated cooperative, combining types one
and four above, and that until fairly recently, the dominant use
of the cooperative type organization has been in the agricultural
areas. There are several facts which encourage agricultural cooperative growth. First, the basic American tradition of helping
one's neighbor, which is especially strong in the rural area, for
example, in the custom of exchanging work and use of machinery,
early day "Barn Raisings", etc. Second, the low income of the
American farmer,6 encouraging economy in purchases and maximum return on all sales, which aims the cooperative form seems
best suited to serve. Third, is the farmers' distrust and dislike
of "big business", even though only local big business. Fourth,
the lack of bargaining power of the individual farmer.
Recognizing the need and value of the cooperative form, most
states have special legislative provisions for the formation of
cooperatives, which although varying greatly in requirements, do
provide the legal machinery for creation of such associations or
corporations.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 18906 expressed the economic
policy of free competition, declaring that every restraint of trade
and commerce is unlawful. The basic rule of Anti-Trust Legislation, that every unit of the economy should act independently in
price determination is in direct conflict with the basic rule of the
cooperative, substitution of concerted action for competition in the
sale of their produce. The Sherman Act in thus creating a barrier
to concerted action in price making made no provision for the
exemption or exclusion of cooperatives. Many states, following
the lead of Congress, passed similar anti-trust laws. However, the
state legislatures, especially those of the agricultural states, were
more sensitive to pressure from the Farm Bloc, and many of the
early state statutes exempted agricultural cooperatives from their
operation. In Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 7 the United States
Supreme Court held that such an exception, that of Illinois which
said:
The provisions of this act shall not apply to agricultural products or livestock while in the hands of the
producer or raiser.
4 Note

3, stpra.
Report of Department of Commerce, "National Income by Industrial Origin", July 1947, showing that even in the current era of farm prosperity, farmers
comprising 20% of the national population received only 10% of the national
income.
15 USC, Sec. 1 to 8.
'184 U.S. 540, 22 S. Ct. 431 (1901).

July, 1953

DICTA

was unconstitutional in that it contravened the equal protection
clause of the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
With this denial of exclusion by the basic Federal law and
the Supreme Court's refusal to uphold the exclusion obtained
under the state law, Agricultural Cooperatives were faced by the
alternatives of openly violating the law or taking steps to change
the law, and as violation of the law was prohibitive, their alternatives boiled down to those expressed by Mr. Olds, Chairman of
United States Steel Corporation, following the outlawing of the
use of the basing point system in the Cement case, that the industry is "faced with two alternatives-either to seek remedial legislation or to educate the supreme Court". 8 The Agricultural Cooperative movement, through the Farm Bloc utilized both alternatives.
As to the exclusion by the states of agricultural cooperatives
from the operation of their anti-trust laws, there was a gradual
erosion of the holding in the Connolly case, first by the Court's
recognition of the power of the states to authorize farmers to
cooperate in marketing their own products in Liberty Warehouse
Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-overative Marketing Association 9 which distinguished the Connolly case on the basis of the
classification involved, until ultimately in Tigner v. Texas, 10 the
Connolly case was flatly overruled, with Justice Frankfurter stating that it was a proper exercise of legislative discretion based
on economic differences between farmer-producers and urban business organizations, that due to the peculiar economic condition
of the former, it was a reasonable classification. It should be noted
that the Texas statute contained an exclusion for agricultural and
livestock cooperatives. Frankfurter stated:
Since Connoly's case was decided, nearly forty years
ago, an impressive legislative movement bears witness
to general acceptance of the view that the differences between agriculture and industry call for differentiation
in the formulation of public policy. The States as well as
the United States have sanctioned cooperative action by
farmers; have restricted their amenability to the antitrust laws; have relieved their organizations from taxation.
This
lic policy,
That the
trated by
where a

clearly indicates the Court's shift of attitude as to pubthe "education of the Supreme Court" appears complete.
shift was limited to Agricultural Cooperatives is illusthe holding in Midland Cooperative Wholesale v. Ickes,1
consumers cooperative 12 sought the protection of the

S Journal of Commerce, April 28, 1948.

1'276 U.S. 71, 48 S. Ct. 291 (1928).
" 310 U.S. 141, 60 S. Ct. 879 (1940).
" 125 F. 2d 618 (CCA 8th, 1942).
15 USC Sec. 833 (i) (13).
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Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 which provides that it shall not be
an unfair method of competition or a violation of the code to sell
to or through a bona-fide and legitimate farmers' cooperative organization, the court held that consumer cooperatives did not fall
within the provision, and upheld the classification, saying:
Congress had the right to discriminate between the
types of cooperatives and it manifestly did so, and the
failure to treat them alike is neither novel nor unreasonable. Laws fostering cooperative marketing and purchasing by farmers have a common genealogy. They stem
from a desire on the part of federal and state legislators
to extend to farmers ways to enable them to
counteract
13
the effects of an increasing urban economy.
The effort by the Farm Bloc for remedial federal legislation
first bore fruit in Sec. 6 of the Clayton Act of 1914,14 which provides:
Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural or horticultural organizations, instituted for
the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profits, or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under
the anti-trust laws.
Further approval of the cooperative form, at least for the
farmer, broadening it to include capital stock, corporate associations and concerted action on selling and pricing was granted in
the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 15 with this provision:
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural
products as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut
or fruit growers may act together, in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in
collectively processing, preparing for market, handling
and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such
products of persons so engaged. Such associations may
have marketing agencies in common and such associations and their members may make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes.
The act stipulated that to come within its provisions, the
cooperative must: (1) operate for the mutual benefit of its members, (2) allow each member to have only one vote or limit divi13 supra.

" 15 USC Sec. 8 et seq.
" 7 USC Sec. 291, 292.
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dends on stock to 8% per year, (3) not deal in products of nonmembers to a greater extent than products of members. The privilege granted of acting in concert with respect to prices was limited
to the extent that it must not "unduly enhance" the price by reason thereof, granting the Secretary of Agriculture rather than
the Department of Justice the power to scrutinize prices, and
empowering him to issue a complaint if the price is "unduly enhanced", and after hearing to issue a cease and desist order if
the complaint is justified. This appears to be a very broad exemption from the anti-trust laws for the agricultural cooperative.
Congress again smiled upon the agricultural cooperative in 1937,
with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 6 authorizing the
Secretary of Agriculture
to enter into marketing agreements with processors, producers, associations of producers, and others engaged in
the handling of any agricultural commodity or product
thereof
and then providing that:
the making of such agreement shall not be held to be in
violation of any of the anti-trust laws of the United States,
and any such agreement shall remain in force after the
termination of said sections.
The "marketing agreement" was a carry-over of the 1933
New Deal program aimed at giving the farmer a parity price,
and, to enhance the price of farm produce, authorized production
control and marketing agreements. These agreements may fix
minimum prices handlers can pay through a control board selected
by the Secretary of Agriculture. However, the specific price is
not fixed, and the primary aim of the agreement is to control the
price by limiting the supply delivered to each market which is
done through the control board.
The above three acts constitute the basic legislative exclusion
of the agricultural cooperative from the federal anti-trust laws.
Concurrently, other legislative favors were being granted. The
Stockyard Act of 1921,17 and the Grain Futures Act of 1922 1
both specifically limited to agricultural cooperatives an exclusion
from the act to such cooperatives' patronage dividends; The Robinson Patman Act, 9 in forbidding price discrimination, provided
by Section 4 that the act does not prohibit a cooperative from
making a patronage dividend; the Cooperative Marketing Act of
1926 20 providing for research and advisory services for cooperatives by the Department of Agriculture; there are also favorable
7 USC Sec. 601 et seq.
'7 USC Sec. 181 et seq.
"42 Stat. L. 998.
"49 Stat. L. 1526, 15 USC See. 13 et seq.
:' 12 Stat. L. 998, 1001.
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provisions in others such as the Bituminous Coal Act, Rural Electrification Act, etc.
That Congress has approved the cooperative form of business organization is manifest from the above. First reading of
the above statutes would indicate that Congress intended to vest
in the Secretary of Agriculture the exclusive power to enforce
the federal anti-trust laws as to agricultural cooperatives, and
to exclude such cooperatives from the operation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Law. Before making too hasty a determination of the
effect of these statutes, one should examine the judicial construction they have received.
That Section 6 of the Clayton Act did not exclude farm cooperatives from the Sherman Act was shown by the case of
United States v. King.21 The Aroostook Potato Shippers' Association, a group of dealers in potatoes, blacklisted certain customers
whom they, for various reasons, considered undesirable, and circulated the list among members and non-members of the association. The court held that a cooperativeois not allowed to adopt a
secondary boycott or other measures which are monopolistic in
violation of the Sherman Act, and Sec. 6 of the Clayton Act is
no protection from a prosecution of such violation.
This case limits the Clayton Act to recognition of the cooperative form as a legal business entity, and not illegal per se as they
seemingly could be held under the Sherman Act.
The position of the agricultural cooperative under the federal
anti-trust laws after enactment of the Capper-Volstead Act and the
Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act is well illustrated by the
Borden case. 2 The five defendants were the milk distributor, a cooperative milk production association, the Milk Wagon drivers' union,
municipal officers, and arbitrators of the dispute between the producers and distributors. All were indicted under the Sherman Act
for engaging in a combination and conspiracy to restrain trade
and commerce in fluid milk among several states by fixing and
maintaining prices paid to the producer and charged to consumers, and controlling the supply of milk. The District Court dismissed the indictment stating that the Capper-Volstead Act gave
the producers authority to organize and fix and control prices in
marketing, and that only the Secretary of Agriculture had the
power to intervene, and he only when the price was unduly enhanced by such practices, and further that the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act removed Farm Cooperatives entirely from
the Sherman Act. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the District Court, holding that these statutes have not superseded
the restrictions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act so far as cooperatives are concerned. The Capper-Volstead Act authorizes cooperatives to market collectively, but does not authorize cooperatives
to conspire with others--cooperative, corporation or individual,
1,2 250
1

F. 908 (Dist. of Mass. (1916)).
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 60 S. Ct. 182 (1939).

July, 1953

DICTA

to fix prices when such a conspiracy violates the Sherman Act.
As to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, the court pointed
out that the Secretary must act strictly within the procedure set
out, and when he so acts and an agreement is entered into, the
Sherman Act is not violated even though the cooperative is given
a monopoly position; but until there is such action by the Sectary of Agriculture, the cooperative is subject to the Sherman Act.
This and the statement of the Court
in U. S. v. Maryland and
23
Virginia Milk Producers Association:
A combination of producers and distributors to eliminate competition and fix prices at successive stages of
marketing of an agricultural product is not privileged
under the Capper-Volstead or Clayton Acts.
And a similar holding in the Columbia River Packers Association
v. Hinton,24 where the cooperative "labor union" of 90% of the
troll fishermen in the Washington and Oregon area sought to require purchasers to enter into an exclusive buying contract under
the protection of the Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act, which
Act was patterned after the Capper-Volstead Act, were held to
be in violation of the Sherman Act, seem to justify the remark

by Kaminsky

:25

It thus appears that what at first seemed unlimited
legislative sanction of cooperative activity has been narrowly limited by judicial construction. The extra-judicial
powers conferred upon administrative officers must be
exercised in the prescribed manner. In the absence of
such official participation, cooperatives, in their marketing practices, are still subject to the anti-trust laws.
This appraisal of the situation has certainly not escaped the
keen eye of the leaders of the Farm Bloc, as stated by Professor
Mund :26
The very fact of their concerted action has given
such groups a considerable measure of political unity and
has enabled a number of them by means of unified pressure to secure an exemption from the anti-trust laws.
For a variety of reasons, however, Congress has been
repeatedly induced and persuaded to narrow the field covered by the anti-trust laws and to take long steps toward
the acceptance of a system of legalized private monopoly.
That such favors have been obtained from Congress in the
past by the Farm Bloc should prove to the most skeptical that,
" 179 F. 2d (1949).
24 315 U.S. 143, 62 S. Ct. 520

(1942).

1 29 Cornell Law Quarterly 251, 256.
'Note 1 supra, at p. 215.
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following setbacks at the hands of the judiciary, additional remedial legislation will be sought and obtained, as well as a continuing program of "educating the Supreme Court".
The foregoing briefly outlines the situation of the agricultural
cooperative at the present time in relation to the anti-trust laws.
It would appear that we can expect continuing pressure tactics
to be applied by the powerful Farm Bloc in Congress for favorable
legislation, and from past experience, it would appear that such
legislation will be forthcoming, the exact pattern, of course, is
impossible to foresee. That the Court is amenable to legislative
mandates is clearly indicated by Mr. Justice Black's statement
in the Associated Press Case :27
It is significant that when Congress has desired to
permit cooperatives to interfere with the competitive system of business, it has expressly done so by legislation.
No individual would be so naive as to assert that the average
individual farmer has any interest in obtaining a monopolistic
position, or has any interest in cooperative action other than
achieving a better economic position, that is, higher prices for
what he produces and lower prices on the items he must purchase.
Neither should any individual be so naive as to believe that the
leaders of the cooperative movement and of the Farm Bloc, just
as to the leaders of any so-called "Big Business", would not use
monopolistic practices to achieve those ends. Improvement of the
economic situation of the farmer is highly desirable, but a monopolistic control over the marketing of farm produce through closely
integrated agricultural cooperatives is as highly undesirable. The
ultimate conflict, economically speaking, is between the consumer
and the producer, and greatly overshadows the present labormanagement dispute. Continued growth of the cooperative movement under a favored legal position could very easily swing the
pendulum in favor of the agricultural producer, just as we have
seen an extreme in labor-management relations under pro-labor
legislation. Therefore, future legislative as well as judicial trends
should be watched with interest, as well as alarm.
It is submitted that legislative action to prevent agricultural
cooperatives obtaining monopolistic control of production of a
particular product should be directed at the following: (1) limitations on the right of cooperatives to federate to form common
marketing agencies; (2) prohibition of the establishment by cooperatives of production control on members; (3) limitation on
the size of cooperatives, either by area or percentage of total
production. It is felt that such legislation would preserve the
advantages of cooperation without sacrificing our basic economic
policy, a competitive market.
-326

U.S. 1, 65 S. Ct. 1416 (1945).

